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PROPOSED TITLE LEGISLATION:
A SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF "MARKETABLE TITLE"
RAY J. AiKEN*
I. INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In contrast to the situation a half-century ago, when a given parcel
of land passed through a title transaction an average of once every
twenty-five to thirty years, the average in today's era of expanded com-
merce and mobile populations is less than once every seven years. Fur-
ther, the great tracts of wild and undeveloped lands which once pre-
dominated in Wisconsin have yielded in substantial degree to ever-
broadening programs of development. Consequently, the significance of
the land record as a prime index of title has declined in favor of land
use.
In the first instance, long-recognized deficiencies in title practice,
formerly tolerable, have been intensified by these changes in land use
and the increased activity in the real estate market, and the need for
improvement has become more apparent. In the second instance, these
changes have suggested a change in substantive approach to the problem.
The ultimate source of dissatisfaction with present title law and
practice is its intensified tendency to exaggerate errors of form and
record, often to the prejudice of interests which are unblemished in
fact. This is the result of an attempt to prevent wholesale usurpation of
legitimate titles in an earlier day, when, possessory protections being
absent, the title examiner was compelled to place heavy, even exclusive
emphasis upon the formal record. Thus a defect in the formal record
came to constitute the equivalent of a defective title in fact, it being
not the fact that a grantor had good title, but the appearance of that
fact of record that rendered a title merchantable.' The effect was a
restriction of free marketability, which is inconsistent with the general
commercialization of real estate.
The function of title examination is to provide assurance that one's
title is legally invulnerable to attack, i.e., good in law and in fact. An
assurance that a title is merchantable or marketable (the terms are
synonymous),2 is an assurance that the title appears from the record to
be good, and such assurance performs this function only on the assump-
tion that the record speaks "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Gerald R. Starr, third year law student, assisted in the preparation of this
article through research and otherwise.
'Stack v. Hickey, 151 Wis. 347, 138 N.W. 1011 (1912) ; Douglass v. Ransom,
205 Wis. 439, 444, 237 N.W. 260, 262 (1931).
2 Douglass v. Ransom, 205 Wis. 439, 446, 237 N.W. 260, 263 (1931).
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the truth." However, this assumption may be unfounded in law or in
fact in either of two generic ways.
First, the record may deceive in what it affirmatively declares. Some
examples would be cases of forgery or other want of authority to sign
deeds, nondelivery, mistaken or fraudulent misdescription of parcels
conveyed, and misdeclaration of marital status.
Secondly, the record may mislead in what it omits to say, as in
cases of unrecorded deeds, satisfactions, or other conveyances; incom-
plete evidences of corporate existence or power, defective instruments
of authority of agents, inadequate evidences of jurisdictional founda-
tion for judgments, ambiguous proofs of identity of persons, and
omitted declarations of marital status. Each such omission produces an
apparent hiatus of record title, total or partial, and some such hiatus
becomes the basis of all objections to title.
Faced with such a hiatus, the title examiner may, objectively, draw
either of two inferences. He may infer from the silence of the record,
or from the ambiguity of its statement, that the missing evidence, if
supplied, would be favorable to title. On the other hand, he may infer
that the missing information would be unfavorable to title, i.e., he may
infer the existence of a prior outstanding claim adverse to or inconsis-
tent with the estate or interest which his client intends to purchase.
Under present law and practice, the alternative possibilities are
generally resolved adversely to marketability of title. A grantor who
does not state whether he is married or single is, for purposes of mar-
ketability, assumed to have been married until proven single. A corpo-
rate representative, an agent, or a fiduciary whose instruments of
authorization are limited or not fully shown is assumed to have acted
without authority until affirmatively shown to have been fully, properly,
and expressly authorized. A judgment is assumed to have been entered
without jurisdiction unless the specific facts necessary to establish juris-
diction are made to appear. It has become the settled conviction, in
sum, that an omission or ambiguity of record fact excites in the ordinary
prudent grantee of lands so powerful a provocation to inquiry that
his mala fides is conclusively implied from his failure to heed the same.
The impact of such a conviction is manifested in the overtechni-
cality which must, and indeed does, flourish. In fairness, it should be
pointed out that there are at least two bases upon which a degree of
such "fly-specking" can be practically and logically justified. First,
since the examiner is compelled to accept a "clean" record without
questioning its complete authenticity, he is conservatively inclined to
stretch that assumption no further than he must. Every "cloud" be-
comes a source of deepest suspicion, regardless of its individual merits.
Second, liberality on his part may very well collide with illiberality on
the part of a subsequent examiner, it being a "matter of common knowl-
[Vol. 50
PROPOSED TITLE LEGISLATION
edge that some examiners of title are more particular and technical
than others about passing titles."'3 It becomes embarassing, to say the
least, when a title examiner must justify his leniency to a client in whose
hands the title suddenly become unmarketable, in fact if not in law.
More seriously, the impact of this conviction upon the facile creation,
transfer, or mortgaging of real property interests elevates the unreal,
the imagined, the merely possible interest which is adverse to the
highly probable title, to the status of a cumbersome and contract
defeating obstacle to the ready achievement of such purposes. Feudal
attitudes to the contrary notwithstanding, there is a dynamic and intelli-
gent commerce in real estate today, one which modern legislation can
afford neither to ignore nor to discourage.
The most technical and the most liberal of title examiners could
agree entirely, however, that a title which is demonstrably invulnerable
to attack, i.e., good in fact, meets any standard of title examination;
and they could further agree on the converse, that a title which is
demonstrably vulnerable to attack meets no standard. So long, however,
as the land record remains broadly open to conflicting possibilities of
inference, legal or factual, the issue of marketability must always re-
main a highly subjective matter, resolved on substantially an ad hoc
basis. The improvement of title law and practice should therefore
achieve, at least in some measure, a greater predictability of interpreta-
tion of title evidences.
II. ALTERNAT IVE APPOACHEs To THE PROBLEM
Two generic avenues of approach are open, though there is not
absolute necessity of electing one to the complete exclusion of the other.
First, "outstanding claims adverse to or inconsistent with" apparent
title could be legislatively or judicially declared to be, in specified situa-
tions, unenforceable, void, barred or extinguished. Secondly, market-
ability could be redefined, legislatively, judicially or through organized
action of the Bar, so as to prohibit, in specified instances, certain infer-
ences adverse to title.
The first approach operates fundamentally against the owner of the
outstanding claim, if such claim exists in fact, and therefore may expro-
priate property. Whether or not this can be done without violating
traditional notions of due process depends, to a large extent, upon the
specific circumstances under which it is attempted. For the purposes
of this discussion, however, nothing shall be assumed in this regard, i.e.,
it will not be assumed either that such extinguishment violates or does
not violate due process.
The second approach operates fundamentally against the title
examiner and his client, the purchaser, in that it effectively compels
3 Id. at 448, 237 N.W. at 263.
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him to accept and pay full value for a title which may, in fact, be
vulnerable to legal attack. While centuries of experience have been had
with the various title-clearing devices of the first category, experience
with those of the second category is comparatively modern, and is
limited in scope.
A. JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATIVE VOIDING OF OUTSTANDING CLAIMS
ADVERSE TO OR INCONSISTENT WITH APPARENT TITLE
1. Actions and special proceedings in rem to quiet title, or actions in
personam having the same effect. Under modern redefinition, acquisition
of jurisdiction over local actions requires only, procedures reasonably
calculated to give notice.4 However, outstanding claims are judicially
extinguished, with legislative sanction, regardless of whether such
notice is actually received.5 Also,
[The owner of an equitable interest] . . . may not sit by and
permit judgment to be taken in either a legal or equitable action
with the expectation that he will not be concluded thereby as in
other cases. He must at the proper time assert his rights under
the circumstances of the particular case in the manner prescribed
by law.6
2. Statutes of limitations, and actions to establish titles acquired there-
under. A usurpation of title by disseisen, which extinguishes legitimate
interests, occurs if an entry is made which is actual, nonpermissive,
notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted for twenty years.7 If the entry
is under a "color of title" instrument, valid or invalid, recorded or
unrecorded, usurpation of title occurs after only ten years of such
disseisen.8 The action to establish titles so acquired, and to avoid titles
so extinguished, is brought under section 281.02 of the Wisconsin
Statutes. However, adverse possession is strictly construed, and it
must be clearly proved that the adverse user is truly hostile to and
inconsistent with the rights of the true owner.9 The statutes run, there-
fore, only against those having the right of possession at the time of
entry, and consequently do not run against remaindermen, reversioners,
or future interest holders generally. The statutes also run only against
those persons having legal capacity to resist.10
4Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ; Wuchter
v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
5 Wis. STAT. §§281.01, 235.60 (1963). Wis. STAT. §269.47 (1963) provides for
defesne even after final judgment when service is by publication, but also
provides that ". . . title to property, sold under such judgment to a purchaser
in good faith, shall not thereby be affected."
6 Oconto Co. v. Bacon, 181 Wis. 538, 547-48, 195 N.W. 412, 415 (1923).
7 WIs. STAT. §§330.08-.10 (1963); Shephard v. Gilbert, 212 Wis. 1, 249 N.W.
54 (1933).
8 WIS. STAT. §§330.06, .07, .10 (1963) ; Marky Investment Inc. v. Arnezeder, 15
Wis. 2d 74, 112 N.W. 2d 211 (1961); Peters v. Kell, 12 Wis. 2d 32, 106 N.W.
2d 407 (1960).
9 Zeisler Corp. v. Page, 24 Wis. 2d 190, 198, 128 N.W. 2d 414, 418 (1964).
10 WIS. STAT. §330.135 (1963).
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It should be noted that the tolling of the statute for minority or
disability does not necessarily extend the ten year ultimate limitation,
even where entry is made against a minor or incompetent. For example,
in case of entry under a forged or fraudulent color of title instrument
against a minor sixteen years old, limitation runs ten years after entry,
not fifteen. This is so because section 330.135(1) merely extends the
limited time sufficiently to allow five years for bringing an action after
the disability is removed. However, the limitation would be fifteen
years if the minor were only eleven years old at the time of entry,
since he would again be allowed five years after removal of his dis-
ability. Note also that tacking of disabilities is not provided for."1 The
result is that interests may be extinguished even though the owner is
not at any time in a position to resist. Nevertheless, because of possible
factual or evidentiary problems, titles founded on adverse possession
are, at best, of doubtful marketability.
3. Recording or Nonrecording acts and equities.
(a) Conventional form-Statutes of this type conventionally ex-
tinguish unrecorded (and otherwise unnoticed) interests upon the rec-
ord of a subsequent conveyance to a bona fide purchaser. Because
Wisconsin's statute, section 235.49, establishes no "period of grace"
and contains no "saving provisions" for minors or incompetents, it
can operate within very short periods of time. However, it is limited
to cases in which one interest-holder double-conveys his interest, i.e.,
it requires that there be a common grantor.'2 Thus, the conven-
tional recording act cannot reach the case of haitus (whole or partial,
true or technical), which is the source of substantially all title objection.
(b) Judicial estoppels by nonrecording-It is well established in
Wisconsin that a bona fide purchaser, induced to rely to his detriment
upon record title, may extinguish a prior unrecorded interest even
though he fails to qualify under section 235.49 by reason of his failure
to record ahead of the prior interest.' 3 The doctrine rests upon estoppel
by laches.' 4 The principle has not been applied, however, to cases other
than those of double-conveyance by a common grantor, so the record
hiatus is unsolved by this device.
(c) Stale record acts (Non-current recording)-Most modem
"marketable title acts," including Wisconsin's section 330.15, are en-
actments of this type. Wisconsin's statute purports to extinguish, in
favor of purchasers "for value," all interests except easements, cove-
nants, and governmental and public utility interests, of which no notice
appears of record within thirty years of the time such purchaser's in-
" Swearingen v. Robertson, 39 Wis. 462 (1876).
32 Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443 (1872).
'3 Marling v. Nommensen, 127 Wis. 363, 106 N.W. 844 (1906).
34 Id. at 369, 106 N.W. at 845
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terest arises.15 Easements and covenants are extinguished under the
same conditions after sixty years.16
As originally enacted in 1941,'1 the statute operated only in favor
of bona fide purchasers and their successors. Since a true owner in
actual possession would give notice of his interest by the fact of his
possession, the statute could not operate originally to divest the titles
of non-recording owners in possession. However, in order to permit
such owners to institute quiet title proceedings despite their nonrecord-
ing, subsection 330.15(4) provided that the section shall not apply to
any action commenced by an owner in possession.
The wording was the unfortunate consequence of an equally un-
fortunate opening sentence, the product of an again unfortunate mis-
classification of the statute as a statute of limitations. Section 330.15 is
not a Statute of limitations, since its period does not begin to run upon
the arising of the cause of action. Instead, its period runs backward
from the time when the purchaser for value arises,"8 and it is there-
fore a form of nonrecording act. Upon the erroneous assumption that
it was a statute of limitations, or upon the assumption that it would be
constitutionally or otherwise more acceptable if it were thought to be
one, section 330.15(1) began with the typical phrase of such statutes:
"... no action... shall be commenced .... " Therefore, it required some
sort of exemption for quiet title actions by owners in possession.
The amendment for 194319 was also somewhat unfortunate. Acting
on the assumption that a record more than thirty years old nevertheless
continued to afford constructive notice, it was suggested that the statute
in its original form could never operate, because no bona fide purchaser
could arise regardless of the antiquity of the voided interest. Rather
than limit the notice-giving power of ancient records, the amendment
reduced the original bona fide purchaser requirement to the present
"purchaser for value.12 0 Probably unwittingly, the amendment thereby
stripped away much of the protection formerly accorded to nonrecording
"owner in possession," since if he ever lost possession, the amendment
prevented him from regaining it even against a land pirate. This spectre
was made the more ominous by the failure of the section to define
possession, so that, conceivably and conventionally, an interest not
currently recorded was completely "up for grabs" whenever its owner
was physically absent from the premises.
15 WIS. STAT. §330.15(1) (1963).
16 WIS. STAT. §330.15(5) (1963).
1' Wis. Laws 1941, ch. 293.
8 ".. . no action . . . shall be commenced . . . which is founded upon any un-
recorded instrument executed more than 30 years prior to the date of com-
mencement of the action . . . ." WIs. STAT. §330.15(1) (1963).
19 Wis. Laws 1943, ch. 109, s. 2.
20 WIs. STAT. §330.15(6) (1963): "The word 'purchaser' as used in this section
shall be construed to embrace every person to whom any estate or interest
in real estate shall be conveyed for a valuable consideration and also every
assignee of a mortgage or lease or other conditional estate."
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Despite these well recognized difficulties with the form of the
statute, its principle has stood the test of experience. Title standards
adopted by the Bar have stipulated that it shall be given force.21 More
to the point, however, the first case has yet to arise in which the
statute has operated to actually extinguish a legitimate interest on the
basis of nonrecording; and even in quarrels over marketability of titles,
no case has presented a test of the statute's basic validity. The irresist-
able conclusion, in a purely empirical sense, is that record defects of all
kinds very rarely reflect actual vulnerability of titles.
4. "Curative" Statutes. In the main, existing statutes of this type simply
accommodate past transactions to modifications of formal requisites.
Thus, wartime deeds, or deeds lacking, for example, seal, witnessing,
acknowledgement, or specific corporate charter authorization, which
were previously invalid or unrecordable, were by curative statutes de-
clared valid or recordable, either generally or after a stated period from
execution or record. In a broad sense, all title legislation is essentially
"curative." In the form in which attorneys have become accustomed to
curative statutes, they are confined to treatment of mere formalities of
execution. 22 At least one of Wisconsin's curative statutes purports sum-
marily to "cure" defects of a substantive sort.23
B. REDEFINITION OF "MARKETABILITY" THROUGH ACTION
OF THE LEGISLATURE, BENCH OR BAR
1. Marketable Title Acts. Nomenclature presents difficulty in this area.
Although section 330.15 has never been denominated a "marketable
title act," neither it nor the Michigan marketable title act 24 declares titles
"marketable," in the sense of declaring that a purchaser entitled to
marketable title must accept them. Instead, both operate as nonrecording
acts in that they affirmatively extinguish claims of which no notice
appears of record within a stated number of years. The "Model Acts"
of Professors Simes and Taylor 25 began with a slightly revised version
of the Michigan act, and proceeded in a rather heterogenous fashion to
21 "Section 330.15 of the Statutes shall be applied and availed of in passing
upon titles in those situations to which that section is by its terms appli-
cable." REAL ESTATE TITLE STANDARD No. 4 (Wisconsin State Bar).
22See Wis. STAT. §§235.15 (use of forms, sufficient in law but other than as
prescribed by statute) ; 235.18 (conveyance not under seal) ; 235.19(12) (de-
fective acknowledgement; 23520 defective execution) ; 23521 (defective seal) ;
235.255 (instrument executed by person in war service) ; 235.48 (conveyances
made under prior statutes) ; 235.68 (defective conveyances of farm or home-
stead property to satisfy indebtedness) ; and 235.69 (1963) (variance in names
of parties). See also Wis. STAT. §§992.01-07 (1963).28WIs. STAT. §23520 (1963), with some ambiguity, purports to validate corpor-
ate conveyances executed "by the proper corporate officers . . . [but] without
corporate authority" after ten years of record, and does so without regard to
good faith or the absence of it on the part of the claimant benefitted. This
provision,, therefore, amounts to a summary validation of a species of forgery.
24 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§26.1271-.1279 (1953).
25 Simes & Taylor, Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation, (1960).
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expand upon the principle so as to cover title problems within Michi-
gan's forty year period.
Wisconsin's section 235.69, relating to name variances which have
appeared of record for twenty years, is a "marketable title act" in a
far more restricted sense, in that it simply declares a title containing
such a defect to be "not unmerchantable." Both on its face and in
practical operation, the statute is innocuous. It is pratically inconceiv-
able that, even initially, the variants with which it deals suggest
forgeries. It is more inconceivable that the title could be upset by the
appearance of the legitimate titleholder after twenty years. Further-
more, it is extremely doubtful that the courts would regard a name
variance, after such a time, as a basis for "reasonable doubt," so as
to make title unmarketable, regardless of the statute.
The principle of the statute is more debatable. It compels the title
examiner to regard as marketable a title which of record, is not con-
clusively invulnerable to legal attack. In so doing, it rather plainly
impairs the obligation of contract between seller and purchaser by
requiring the latter to accept less than he bargained for. Suppose the
unlikely event occurred, i.e., the legitimate titleholder appears, exposes
the forgery and seeks to eject the purchaser. Section 235.69 itself arms
the purchaser with no defense; and in most cases he finds his defense,
if at all, only in enactments of the first category explored above.
2. Prima Facie Evidence Enactments. Such enactments, prime Wis-
consin examples of which are sections 235.46 (relating to affidavits
stating facts of record) and 992.08 (relating to certificates of county
tax sales) are a clumsy and indirect, but apparently effective way of
accomplishing much the same thing as does section 235.69. That the
legislative mind was not centered upon the problem of judicial admis-
sibility of such affidavits is evident from the fact that the provisions
were far removed from Chapters 327 and 328 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, which deal with that subject. Unquestionably, the force of
these sections was to compel a title examiner to accept such "evidence"
as proof of marketability, and this appears to be the settled construc-
tion.2
6
Statutes of this type go, at least arguably, a small step beyond
section 235.69, in that they afford the title examiner and purchaser
documentary proof upon which to build at least a prima facie case in
favor of his title. But of what importance is this evidence? Either
the questioned fact will never be in issue, or it will come into issue
when the title is directly challenged. If the latter, it can hardly be
assumed that the challenger will come into court with no evidence-
simply putting the purchaser to his proofs.
26 Haumersen v. Sladky, 220 Wis. 91, 264 N.W. 653 (1936).
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The fact that such statutes, especially section 235.46, have "worked
well" testifies eloquently to the highly significant fact that record defects
rarely reflect any real likelihood that the title is vulnerable to attack,
and that title objection based upon such defects is, therefore, without
objective justification. The best argument that can be made for "prima
facie evidence" statutes is that they afford a seller a phantom weapon
with which to put to rest phantom assaults upon his title. By the same
token, however, real defects of title are immune from such statutes.
They therefore do not reach the essential problem: the conflicting possi-
bilities of inference, legal and factual, in determining the marketability
issue.
3. Bar Association Title Standards. To the extent that title standards
may be enforceable against both title examiners and purchasers, they
operate in very much the same fashion as do marketable title and prima
facie evidence statutes, discussed supra, and judicial redefinitions of
marketability, discussed post. They are distinguishable only in that they
may receive a lesser degree of judicial recognition, and in that they
may yield more readily to practical problems of original enactment and
change. They can properly reach no further, however, than existing
legislation and judicial decision will carry them; they must amount
simply to a recitation of particular applications of settled law. Within
their limitations however, improved title standards can, and do, improve
title practice. But if there are problems inherent in existing title law
itself, no improvement of title standards can reach such problems.
4. Judicial redefinition of marketability. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in Haumersen v. Sladky,2 7 clearly implied that the title examiner
in that case had carried improbable technicality beyond even the wide
discretionary limits declared in Douglass v. Ransom.3 This case illus-
trates the possibility of seeking to improve title practice by resort to
the courts. However, the case also illustrates the limitations of that
approach, and the fatal weakness thereof. Like the title examiner him-
self, the court may be torn between inclinations to liberality and con-
servatism. Like the title examiner himself, the court may be unable to
discount entirely the possibility that a title which it forces upon an
objecting purchaser may prove defective in fact. In any event, it is
plain that individual litigants will be loath to carry the burden of
achieving improved title practice through the courts; and that, in
view of the variety of defects to be attended to, judicial redefinition of
a comprehensive sort would be painfully slow.
5. Broader Use of Title Insurance. This possibility probably represents
the most promising approach in this category. Marketability of title and
insurability of title are not comparable terms, principally because the
27 Ibid.
28205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).
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insurer's appraisal of a given risk will normally reflect the situation's
realistic potentialities, not merely its literal or technical implications.
This alternative has, in common with the preceeding four devices,
the characteristic that it does nothing to improve the title itself, though
it ordinarily operates to produce easy marketability. It is, by present
experience, hardly less expensive-in terms of its total impost on the
real estate industry-than any other device for title assurance; and
this may be true precisely because it does nothing to improve the title.
In individual cases, reliance upon title insurance may operate to impose
extreme hardships, by way of underinsurance, technical policy defenses,
or assertions of rights of subrogation against uninsured vendors or
mortgagors. The ultimate shortcoming of the title insurance device,
however, is the practical difficulty in achieving and maintaining pro-
tection of the many thousands of title transactions on an individual-
policy basis. Present title practice cannot be expected to yield over-
night to any near-universal substitution of title insurance.
III. PROPOSED WISCONSIN STATUTE SECTION 235.491
The Title Legislation and Standards Committee of the State Bar
of Wisconsin, at its June, 1963 section meeting, approved the following
proposed statute for presentation to the state legislature :29
Section 235.497. Notice from the record.30
(1) A purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice
as defined in sub. (2) hereof, and his successors in interest, shall
take and hold the estate or interest purported to be conveyed to
29 For the history of the proposed legislation, and a discussion of an earlier
draft of the proposal, see Lovejoy, Proposed Title Legislation, 1963 WiscoN-
SIN BAR BULLETIN 45, (April) ; Aiken, Commentary on Proposed Title Legisla-
tion, 1963 WISCONSIN BAR BULLETIN 49, (April).
30 Enactment of the proposed section 235.491 would necessitate amendment of
section 75.30 to read:
Section 75.30.
(1) Five-Year Limitation. In addition to other applicable limitations, no
action shall be brought by the original owner of the recovery of lands pur-
porting to be conveyed by a tax deed, whether or not void on its face, after
the expiration of five years from the date of the recording thereof, in cases
where the grantee in the tax deed shall have taken actual possession of such
land within two years after the date of such recording and shall have actually
and continuously maintained such possession to the end of such period of
five years.
(2) Affidavit of Possession. Proof of such possession of the grantee and
the record of the tax deed shall be conclusive evidence of the legality and
effectiveness of the deed and of the title conveyed. As a means of proving
possession the grantee may, at any time after five years from the date of the
tax deed, record an affidavit that such deed was issued and recorded and
that the grantee is in possession of the real estate described therein as defined
in section 75.31 and has been in such possession for a continuous period com-
mencing within two years after such deed recording and has actually and
continuously maintained such possession to the end of such period of five
years. A certified copy of the record of any affidavit of possession shall con-
stitute prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein.
(3) Exclusions and Application. The term "grantee" shall include any
subsequent owner of the title of the lands. The term "former owner" shall
[Vol. 50
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such purchaser free of any claim adverse to or inconsistent with
such estate or interest, if such adverse claim is dependent for its
validity or priority upon:
(a) Non-delivery. Non-deliveryor conditional or revocable
delivery, of any recorded conveyance, unless the condition or
revocability is expressly referred to in such conveyance or other
recorded instrument.
(b) Conveyance outside chain of title and not identified by
definite reference. Any conveyance, transaction or event not ap-
pearing of record in the chain of title to the real estate affected,
unless such conveyance, transaction or event be identified by
definite reference in an instrument of record in such chain. No
reference shall be definite which fails to specify, by direct refer-
ence to a particular place in the public land record, or, by positive
statement, the nature and scope of the prior outstanding interest
created or affected by such conveyance, transaction or event, the
identity of the original or subsequent owner or holder of such
interest, the real estate affected, and the approximate date of such
conveyance, transaction or event.
(c) Unrecorded extensions of interests expiring by lapse of
time. Continuance, extension or renewal of rights of grantees,
purchasers, optionees, or lessees under any land contract, option,
lease or other conveyance of an interest limited to expire, abso-
lutely or upon a contingency, within a fixed or determinable time,
where two years have elapsed after such time, unless there is
recorded a notice or other instrument referring to such continu-
ance, extension or renewal and stating or providing a later time
for the enforcement, exercise, performance or termination of
such interest and then only if less than two years have elapsed
after such later time. This paragraph shall not apply to life estates,
mortgages or trust deeds, nor shall it inferentially extend any
interest otherwise expiring by lapse of time.
(d) Non-identity of persons in chain of title. Non-identity
of persons named in, signing or acknowledging one or more re-
lated conveyances or instruments affecting real estate, provided
the persons appear in such conveyances under identical names or
under variants thereof, including inclusion, exclusion or use of:
commonly recognized abbreviations, contractions, initials, or for-
eign, colloquial or other equivalents; first or middle names or
initials; simple transpositions which produce substantially similar
pronunciation; articles or prepositions in names or titles; descrip-
tion of entities as corporations, companies, or any abbreviation
or contraction of either; name-suffixes such as senior or junior;
where such identity or variance has appeared of record for five
years.
(e) Marital Interests. Dower or homestead of the spouse
of any transferor of an interest in real estate, where the re-
not refer to or include any real estate title or interest therein while owned,
occupied and used by any person defined in section 196.01 or 195.02 or any
trustee or receiver of any such person or any mortgagee or trust deed trustee
or receiver thereof. This section shall apply to tax deeds heretofore or here-
after recorded, but the commencement of any action shall not be precluded by
this section until two years after its effective date.
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corded conveyance purporting to transfer the same states that
the person executing it is single, unmarried or widowed; or fails
to indicate the marital status of such transferor, and where such
conveyance has, in either case, appeared of record for five years.
This paragraph shall not apply to the interest of a married
woman who is described of record as holder in joint tenancy
with such transferor.
(f) Lack of authority of officers, agents, or fiduciaries. Any
defect or insufficiency in authorization of any purported officer,
partner, agent or fiduciary to act in the name or on behalf of
any corporation, partnership, principal, trust, estate, minor, in-
competent or other holder of an interest in real estate purported
to be conveyed in a representative capacity, after the conveyance
has appeared of record for five years.
(g) Defects in judicial proceedings. Any defect, or irregu-
larity, jurisdictional or otherwise, in an action or proceeding out
of which any judgment or order affecting real estate issued after
the judgment or order has appeared of record for five years.
(h) Non-existence, incapacity or incompetency. Non-ex-
istence, ultra vires act or legal incapacity or incompetency of any
purported person or legal entity, whether natural or artificial,
foreign or domestic, provided the recorded conveyance or instru-
ment affecting the real estate shall purport to have been duly
executed by such purported person or legal entity, and shall
have appeared of record for five years.
(i) Facts not asserted of record. Any fact not appearing of
record, but the opposite or contradiction of which appears affirma-
tively and expressly in a conveyance, affidavit or other instrument
of record in the chain of title of the real estate affected for five
years. Such facts may, without limitation by non-inclusion, relate
to age, sex, birth, death, capacity, relationship, family history,
descent, heirship, names, identity or persons, marriage, marital
status, homestead, possession or adverse possession, residence,
service in the armed forces, conflicts and ambiguities in descrip-
tions, identification of any recorded plats or subdivisions, corpo-
rate authorization to convey, and the happening of any condition
or event which terminates an estate or interest.
(j) Defects in tax deed. Non-existence or illegality of any
proceedings from and including the assessment of the real estate
for taxation up to and including the execution of the tax deed
after the tax deed has been of record for five years.
(k) Interests not of record within 30 years. Any interest of
which no affirmative and express notice appears of record within
thirty years.
(2) A purchaser has notice of a prior outstanding claim or
interest, within the meaning of this section wherever, at the time
such purchaser's interest arises in law or equity:
(a) such purchaser has affirmative notice apart from the
record of the existence of such prior outstanding claim, including
notice, actual or constructive, arising from use or occupancy of
the real estate by any person at the time such purchaser's interest
therein arises, whether or not such use or occupancy is exclusive;
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provided, however, that no constructive notice shall be deemed
to arise from use or occupancy unless due and diligent inquiry
of persons using or occupying such real estate would, under the
circumstances, reasonably have disclosed such prior outstanding
interest; nor unless such use or occupancy is actual, visible, open
and notorious; or
(b) there appears of record in the chain of title of the real
estate affected, within thirty years and prior to the time at which
the interest of such purchaser arises in law or equity, an instru-
ment affording affirmative and express notice of such prior out-
standing interest conforming to the requirements of definiteness
of subsection (1) (b) ; or
(c) the applicable provisions of paragraphs (c) to (k) in-
clusive of subsection (1), requiring that an instrument have
remained for a time of record, have not been fully satisfied.
(3) This section shall not be applied to bar or infringe any
prior outstanding interest in real estate:
(a) while owned, occupied or used by any public service
corporation as defined in section 196.01 or any railroad corpo-
ration as defined in section 195.02, or any trustee or receiver of
any such corporation, or any mortgagee or trust deed trustee or
receiver thereof; nor any such interest while held by the United
States, the state or any political subdivision or municipal corpo-
ration thereof; or
(b) which, at the time such subsequent purchaser's interest
arises, is unplatted, vacant and unoccupied, unused, unimproved
and uncultivated; except that this subsection (b) shall not apply
to prior interests dependent for validity or priority upon the cir-
cumstances described in paragraphs (a), (b), (j) and (k) of
subsection (1).
(4) The term "chain of title" as used in this section shall
include instruments, actions and proceedings discoverable by rea-
sonable search of the public records and indices affecting real
estate in the office of the register of deeds and in probate and of
clerks of courts of the counties in which the real estate is lo-
cated; a tract index shall be deemed an index where the same is
publicly maintained.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to raise or
support any inference adverse or hostile to marketability of titles.
IV. WHAT Is THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE
OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION?
It should be noted that the proposed legislation makes no exclusive
choice between the various alternative approaches to the problem. It
anticipates the continued utilization of all of them, and would not be
adverse to their expansion and liberalization. However, the fact that
no exclusive choice is made should not dispense with choice altogether.
Title practice will hardly be improved if it continues to become more
complex and multiprincipled. This was the chief difficulty with other
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proposals studied and rejected by the Title Legislation and Standards
Committee.8 1
The current proposals adopt the "non-current recording" principle
of section 330.15 of the Wisconsin Statutes, and apply that principle
to a small set of selected transactions less than thirty years old. As
in the original form of that enactment,32 the proposals operate only in
favor of. bona fide purchasers, and give full sway to constructive notice
arising from actual use or occupancy. They correct any supposition,
arising from form or placement in the statute books, that they are
"statutes of limitations" in any proper sense of that term. Therefore,
no specific provision to exempt actions by "owners in possession" is
required. They meet the problem of constructive or actual notice from
old records directly, by depriving such records of their notice-giving
power, as against "otherwise" bona fide purchasers. Indeed, were
subsection (1)(a)-(j) inclusive deleted from the proposal, leaving
only (1)(k), "Interests not of record within 30 years," the proposal
would represent simply a restatement of section 330.15 as originally
enacted, involving but two substantive modifications.
First, the nonrecording period for easements and covenants would
be reduced from sixty to thirty years. Second, notice from possession
would have been defined, by (2) (a) and (3) (b) of the proposal, so
as to permit notice from non-exclusive possession, limit notice from
occasional or seasonal occupancy, and exclude wild and undeveloped
lands from operation of the section.33 In other respects, the definition
of "notice from possession" stated in (2) (a) appears to correspond to
existing case law.3 4
Apart from the fact that the Bar has generally lent its approval to
the principle of section 330.15 as the best device for improvement of
title practice, the proposals favor that principle over the suggested
alternatives for reasons generally implicit in the foregoing discussion
of the alternatives themselves.
31In 1960 the University of Michigan Law School published the first of several
books on title reform, Simes & Taylor, Improvement of Conveyancing by
Legislation, (1960). This was followed by Simes & Taylor, Model Title
Standards,. (1960), and Simes & Taylor, A Handbook for More Efficient
Conveyancing, (1961).
After thorough study, the Title Legislation and Standards Committee
elected to abandon the Simes-Taylor approach. It was felt that these pro-
posals offered no single-principled scheme by which a greater predictability
of interpretation of title evidences might be achieved, and that Wis. STAT.
-§330.15 (1963) formed a more familiar and better base upon which to build.
32 Subsection (6> of Section 330.15, defining a "purchaser" simply as one who
takes for value, was not added until 1943. Wis. Laws 1943, ch. 109, s. 2.
33 It would be entirely feasible, by slight amendment of the proposed (2) (a),
to allow the stale notice provision to operate upon such wild and undeveloped
lands, without making such essentially "unguarded" lands subject to the re-
maining cut-off provisions of the proposal.
34 Olmsted v. McCrory, 158 Wis. 323, 148 N.W. 871 (1914); Miller v. Green,
264 Wis. 159, 58 N.W. 2d 704 (1953); Bump v. Dahl, 26 Wis. 2d 607, 133
N.W. 2d 295 (1965).
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V. WHAT CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLIE THE REDucED GRAcE PERIODS?
Though consistently faithful to the general principle of nonrecording
and stale notice, the proposals, in subsections (1) (a)-(j), define speci-
fied situations in which, it is felt, the thirty year "grace period" is
unwarranted, unrealistic, and largely ineffective to meet the central
problem of excessive "phantom" title-defects. As a general proposition,
this proposed "grace period" is five years. 5 As above noted, the "grace
period" for easements and covenants is reduced from sixty to thirty
years.
In proposing these reductions, a number of factors have been taken
into account, and a general balance of probabilities applied. Generally,
the aim has been to facilitate the title transaction as thoroughly as
possible without incurring substantial risk that legitimate interests will
be unfairly extinguished thereby. The emphasized words indicate the
key considerations.
The substantiality of the risk is dependent, first, upon the likelihood
that a given record defect will reflect the existence of a real outstanding
claim. Experience would indicate that in the overwhelming majority of
cases, there is no such likelihood, even in the case of "fresh" records.
Variances are almost universally the product of mistake or inadvertence.
The substantiality of the risk is dependent, second, upon the likeli-
hood that the legitimate interest-holder will use the protective measures
available to him, and the first key consideration thereby merges some-
what with the second. However, under the proposed statute, mere
negative, ambiguous or inferential record notice more than five years
old is declared ineffective in the cases specified; all forms of actual or
affirmative notice, on or off the record, will protect the legitimate
interest; and the scope of notice from possession or occupancy is con-
siderably expanded. Subsection (2) (a) imposes a rather strict respon-
sibility upon the subsequent purchaser to explore the fact of physical
occupancy thoroughly. By subsection (3) (b), unplatted, vacant and
unoccupied, unused, unimproved and uncultivated lands are totally
exempted, on the hypothesis that normally-available possessory pro-
tections are absent in those cases. Finally, the proposal operates only
in favor of "a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice...
and his successors in interest ... ."36 By this limitation, legitimate in-
terests cannot be usurped in favor of defrauders, donees, heirs, devisees,
or creditors; but only in favor of those who innocently infer that the
current, i.e., thirty-year, record supports the apparent title, and change
position in reliance upon that inference.
Possessory protections will most commonly be available to the
holders of present possessory interests, but not equally to future interest
3 5Proposed Section 235.491(1) (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (j).
36 Proposed Section 235.491 (1).
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holders. These would include, generally, remaindermen after life estates,
reversioners after leaseholds, beneficiaries under trusts (especially re-
mote, contingent 'r residual beneficiaries), and married women entitled
to dower or homestead protection. In each case, some complicity of the
present interest-holder in the fraudulent usurpation of the future in-
terest will ordinarily be present; for otherwise the assertion of the
hostile claim would evoke affirmative action by the present interest-
holder, which would automatically operate to protect the future interest
as well.
The principal protection afforded such interests, in common with all
other legitimate interests under the proposals, is a practical one which
arises out of the grace period. A person inclined to attempt a fraud
against a legitimate interest is motivated by a hope of present gain.
He does not, and generally cannot, predict circumstances five years
into the future. The perpetration of his fraud, under the proposed
statutes, must be anticipated by recording a fraudulent conveyance five
years in advance, else the proposals will not operate, and if the pro-
posed statutes will not operate in the interim, the defrauder will ex-
perience the greatest difficulty in realizing any profit out of his fraud.
A final element of protection to legitimate interests of all kinds is
the integrity of the legal profession itself, especially when that fact
is joined with the seemingly innocuous provisions of section 59.513. 7
A title fraud, to be successful under the proposed legislation, will
practically require the complicity of someone having a considerable
expertise in both title law and conveyancing. Whatever might be the
inclination of the lay public to attempt a title fraud, there is every basis
for the assertion that the legal profession would only rarely include a
member inclined to assist in such a scheme, to say nothing of naming
himself as draftsman of the fraudulent conveyance.
Traditionally and modernly, Wisconsin's policy and practice has
placed principal reliance upon the integrity of notaries public as a
stopgap to forgeries and related frauds. Until comparatively recently,
it was common practice for them to draft conveyances as well as taking
acknowledgments of them. Though screening practices in the com-
missioning of notaries have been lenient, there has been a remarkable
paucity of instances in which forged conveyances have passed even
the casual and often inexpert scrutiny of a notary.
The proposed legislation assumes that, while there may be some
risk of a coincidence of all of these factors in derogation of legitimate
interests, the proposals reduce that risk to obvious insubstantiality.
37 WIS. STAT. §59.513 (1) (1963) : "No instrument by wNhich the title to real estate
or any interest therein . . . is conveyed . . . shall be recorded by the register
of deeds unless the name of the person who . . . drafted such instrument is
printed, typewritten, stamped or written thereon in a legible manner. .. "
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However, the proposals would be totally ineffective if they could
never operate to extinguish a legitimate interest. This is to say the
possible validation of forgeries and other fraudulent usurpations of title
must be countenanced if a statute of this type is to operate at all. The
present section 330.15 involves the same possibility. The ultimate issue
is simply whether extinguishment of legitimate interests, however
rarely or improbably, is an unfair provision, under any of the pre-
dictable circumstances in which it may be expected to operate.
The question of fairness or unfairness is necessarily a bilateral
consideration. If regarded purely and simply from the standpoint of
the person whose right may be extinguished, any possibility of such
extinguishment is "unfair." In this sense, quiet title actions, statutes
of limitations, judicial estoppels, conventional recording acts and the
present section 330.15 are also "unfair." Bilaterally regarded, however,
there must be taken into account the necessities of real estate commerce,
and the circumstances of the subsequent purchaser who seeks legal
protection against extinguishment of his interest.
It certainly cannot be disputed that title law and practice have made
every effort to guarantee the complete accuracy, freedom from doubt
or ambiguity, and general reliability of the public land records. Neither
can it be disputed that these efforts have not been entirely successful,
and probably never will be. The problem is, therefore, whether it is
any more "fair" to foist the losses which may arise out of these occasional
instances of unreliability of evidence upon the owner of the misrepre-
sented title or upon the subsequent purchaser who depends upon it.
Caveat emptor, if it were broadly acceptable as a principle of com-
mercial law, would insist upon the former. The proposals being dis-
cussed, within their very severe limitations, would insist upon the latter.
In final analysis, the reason for this proposed degree of departure
from traditional policy is that caveat emptor, applied to commercial
real estate transactions, unreasonably burdens and discourages those
transactions. A purchaser under legal forewarning to "be wary or be
sorry" can be required, in fairness, to extend his wariness no further
than probable inference from available data would suggest. Present
title law and practice insists that he go further, running every vagrant
suspicion to the ground, and even then declares that he is unprotected
by the evidences upon which he has relied.
Whatever may be the propriety of caveat emptor as applied to an
industry in which the good faith purchaser and the legitimate owner
are [generally] equally vulnerable to loss by fraud, it is submitted that
modern real estate commerce is not such an industry. Present law and
practice compels thousands of buyers and, sellers to go to ridiculous
extremes of wariness, assurance, and "title correction" in order to lay
to rest the ghosts of typographical errors and technical omissions.
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hoping thereby to avoid the remote possibility of extinguishing one
legitimate interest, whose owner may or may not have extended the
slightest reasonable effort to protect himself.
This, it is submitted, is unfair to the modern real estate industry.
Conversely, no objectionable unfairness inheres in the remote but con-
ceivable possibility that the proposals may operate, as many other
accepted forms of title legislation now operate, to cut off legitimate
interests.
VI. How WILL "SHORT GRACE PERIODS" OPERATE
IN SPECIFIC CASES, As COMPARED To PRESENT LAW?
Each of the subsections of subsection (1) of the proposed statute
will be discussed in order.
(a) Non-delivery. Under present law, an undelivered deed is a
nullity.38 Whether or not the same proposition applies to undelivered
contracts related to land is a matter of some doubt, as is the question
whether affirmative "acceptance" is indispensable to operation of a
conveyance in favor of an adult and competent grantee.3 9
In Everts v. Agnes,40 after extensive soul-searching, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a grantor, who entrusted a fully-executed
deed to a third-party, with instructions to deliver to the grantee on
fulfillment of certain conditions, remained owner of the property even
as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser from the named grantee,
when the grantee procured the deed without satisfying the conditions.
This position has since been qualified only to the extent of holding,
inconsistently, that if a deed is obtained from grantor himself by
grantee himself, the delivery being conditional, the condition itself is
unenforceable.
4 1
Delivery is a formal manifestation of intent to transfer, which is
its principal element.4 2 Why the formality of delivery should be super-
imposed upon formalities of preparation, signature, sealing, attestation,
and acknowledgment before our law will conclude that grantor really
intended the transfer proclaimed by his deed is a mystery lost somewhere
in the feudal ceremony of livery of seisen, when lands were customarily
conveyed without benefit of any writing whatsoever. From the time
when statutes of frauds did away with parol transfers, the lingering
semblance of excuse for continued insistence on delivery was that a
considerable time interval necessarily and frequently occurred between
38 Chaudoir v. Witt, 170 Wis. 556, 170 N.W. 932 (1919) ; Giblin v. Giblin, 173
Wis. 632, 182 N.W. 357 (1921); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187
N.W. 750 (1922) ; Kolber v. Steinhafel, 190 Wis. 468, 209 N.W. 595 (1926);
Ritchie v. Davis, 26 Wis. 2d 636, 133 N.W. 2d 312 (1965).
39 Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 270 (1860) ; Jones v. Caird, 153 Wis. 384, 141 N.W.
228 (1913); Estate of Duwe, 229 Wis. 115, 281 N.W. 669 (1938).
40 4 Wis. 356 (1855), 6 Wis. 445 (1857).
41 Chaudoir v. Witt, 170 Wis. 556, 170 N.W. 932 (1919).
42 Herzing v. Hess, 263 Wis. 617, 58 N.W. 2d 430 (1953).
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execution of a deed and its intended time of operation. Widespread
illiteracy and comparative unavailability of able conveyancers made it
broadly convenient to allow the parties to breathe life into their trans-
action by the uncomplicated* device of manual tradition.
As a reading of the cases cited above would suggest, the principal
impact of delivery questions on modern conveyancing is in disputes
between heirs over "deathbed" conveyances. Rarely will a bona fide
purchaser be involved. Where such a purchaser is involved, however,
Everts v. Agnes would appear to control the case against him, in favor
of the heir whose equity is limited to his birthright.
Modern commercial law has long deemphasized the delivery re-
quirement, and now proposes, by several provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code,43 to eliminate it altogether, at least as against bona
fide purchasers. The rationale is essentially one of estoppel. If, to suit
personal convenience, a grantor sees fit to perform all of the various
formalities requisite to draftsmanship and execution of a commercial
instrument, the risk of possible unintended circulation is, by present
commercial law, borne by the originator of the instrument, not by him
who deals in reliance hpon its supposed validity.
By precisely the same token, subsection (1)(a) of the proposed
statute would reverse the rule of Everts v. Agnes in real estate trans-
actions, wherever the "undelivered" conveyance appeared of record. A
grantor who purports, by signature, attestation, and acknowledgment,
to effect a present transfer of an interest in real estate, ought not to
be heard, as against the subsequent claim of a bona fide purchaser, to
assert the essentially secret defense of nondelivery. Because the element
of estoppel is more obviously present in nondelivery cases than in cases
dealt with in the later subsections of the proposal, no "grace period"
is provided in this instance.
(b) Conveyance outside chain of title and not identified by definite
reference. This species of title defect is related to non-recording, and
it is, therefore, again deemed inappropriate to establish a grace period
with reference to it. The basic kind of defect at which the subsection
is aimed is the practice of referring, in one conveyance, to some in-
cumbrance or limitation of title to which such conveyance is made
subject, or, probably more frequently, which is excepted from the
warranty of such conveyance. For example, there may be excepted
from a conveyance "a certain lease in favor of Charles Jones," or "a
43 For example, U.C.C. §3-306 establishes "nondelivery, or delivery for a special
purpose" as a defense to the claim of one not a holder in due course. How-
ever, U.C.C. §3-305, comment 3, makes it clear that it is intended that a holder
in due course hold free from the defense of "nondelivery, conditional de-
livery or delivery for a special purpose." Holding an undelivered deed to
be a "nullity," of course, would rule out any such subsequent vitalization of




certain easement in favor of Lot Six." If such outstanding leasehold,
mortgage, option, easement, contract or other interest is properly of
record within -thirty years in the chain of title to the affected lands,
the indefinite reference thereto, though itself insufficient to give notice
of the interest, is immaterial. But the proposed subsection (1) (b)
would operate to excuse inquiry as to the unrecorded interest, which
under present practice often requires running the vagrant interest to
the ground through almost every possible avenue of investigation. The
proposal does not prevent notice of a prior unrecorded interest from
being given by reference in a subsequently-recorded instrument; but it
does insist that such reference be sufficiently definite to apprise the
title examiner of the important details of the outstanding interest. For
example, subsection (1)(b) requires that such reference specify the
nature and scope of the interest, the identity of its owner or holder,
the real estate affected by it and the date of the conveyance, transaction,
or event by which it was created. Such information, if not directly
stated, may be by "direct reference to a particular place in the public
land record"-necessarily either outside the chain of title of the lands
affected, or more than thirty years old-where the details are set out.
The subsection may conceivably have a second application to con-
veyances, affidavits and the like, which may of themselves be so
fatally indefinite as to fail to identify the essential details of the in-
terest sought to be created or noticed. For example, a grant of an ease-
ment may afford no means of identifying the servient estate, but may
appear in the chain of title purely by reason of the identification of
the grantor. Such grantor may own many tracts, any of which might
constitute the servient estate. To the extent to which there is visible
evidence of the exercise of such an easement on the ground, of course,
subsection (2)(a) of the proposal would protect the interest. In cases
where this was not true, however, subsection (1) (b) could operate,
except as against governmental and utility interests, protected by sub-
section (3) (a).
(c) Unrecorded extension of interests expiring by lapse of time.
A common title defect is the presence of various limited-interest con-
veyances, without affirmative evidence of their discharge, release, for-
feiture or abandonment. For example, the record may show a land
contract from A to B, calling for final "closing" by December 1, 1963.
In 1962, A conveys and warrants full title to C. Early in 1966, C
proposes to sell or mortgage to D. The transaction is obstructed by the
purported A-B contract.
The proposition that "time is not of the essence" of the ordinary
contract relating to real estate is well-recognized, and was emphasized
in Long Investment Co. v. O'Donnell,44 where a contract in the ordi-
44 3 Wis. 2d 291, 88 N.W. 2d 674 (1958).
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nary interim form was held, as between the parties, enforceable ap-
proximately three years after its stated date of performance, neither
party having done anything of consequence in the interim to settle or
close the transaction. Whether or not the subsequent purchaser from
the original vendor would have taken subject to the "open equity" of
the first purchaser had the former been aware simply of the existence
of the earlier contract was not, of course, touched upon; but that
problem provokes the proposed (1) (c).
In the typical case, investigation will most often disclose that the
prior executory interest, in fact, does not encumber the title. The prior
purchaser will either have forfeited his interest or will have settled
the same on some informal basis. Especially will this be true in those
cases in which the prior interest is already two years past its stated
time of expiration.
The propriety of assuming that interests of purchasers, lessees,
optionees, or other interest holders have expired after their stated con-
summation dates is buttressed by the fact that, but for possibilities of
equitable relief from purely technical time defaults, any fully effective
"continuance, extension, or renewal" of such interests ordinarily de-
mands execution and recording of a new document. Otherwise, the
case would logically come within the principle of conventional non-
recording acts, 5 and the bona fide purchaser would be protected inde-
pendently of the proposed statute.
The only function of the proposed subsection (1) (c), therefore, is
to negative any suggestion that the presence on the record of the orig-
inal, apparently expired conveyance itself provokes particular inquiry
as to possible exercise, extension, or renewal. It may be doubted that
any "grace period" whatever is appropriate in such a case, since none
is provided by section 235.49, relating to the effect of an unrecorded
deed. Certainly it would be unfortunate if, by process of negative
inference, the proposed statute were construed to mean that, for
example, the recording of a six-month option, rendered the title un-
marketable until two years after the option, by its terms, had expired.
No such negative inference is intended. What is intended is to provide
that after such two year period inquiry is unnecessary, regardless of
whether or not it may have been necessary before. The grace period
is allowed as a compromise concession to "informal" extension ar-
rangements, in the hope that by briefly "clogging" the titles of vendors,
optionors and lessors, any inclination to reconvey in fraudulent defiance
of such arrangements will be effectively discouraged.
(d) Non-identity of persons in chain of title. By process of in-
consistent technical inference, today's title examiner assumes that when
property owned by Charles D. Jones appears to have been conveyed by
45 WIs. STAT. §235.49 (1963).
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Charles D. Jones, the owner and the transferor are identical; whereas
if the same property appears to have been conveyed by Chas. D. Jones,
or Charles Jones, or C. D. Jones, the transferor is an interloper and,
usually, a forger.
46
These technical approaches to the problem are unsatisfactory on
two accounts. First, the inference favorable to title, i.e., that the sub-
sequent conveyance is not a forgery, regardless of the perfection or
imperfection of its form, is not legally dependable. If the conveyance
is a forgery, the most circumspect of title examinations is of no avail.
Second, the inference unfavorable to title, i.e., that imperfection of
form suggests a reasonable probability of not only forgery, but a clumsy
attempt at that, is extremely unrealistic.
Present practice permits the inference unfavorable to title to be
effectively overcome, for purposes of marketability, in either of two
ways; by passage of twenty years under section 235.69, or immediately
by the recording of an affidavit of identity under section 235.46. Why
it should be supposed that one initially guilty of forgery would have
any compunction against correcting his technical mistakes by false
affidavit is apparently neither questioned nor explained.
Thus, the central problem in modern title law and practice is, as
above suggested, the problem of forgery in one species or another.
Because our system of land titles to date includes nothing akin to public
signature cards or fingerprint indentification systems, our ultimate
defense against forgery lies in the system of notarial acknowledgment.
When that defense has been overcome, the question is simply one of
the forger discriminating between victims.
It would appear senseless to hold, as is now held, that an imper-
sonator and forger who misspells or abbreviates a name provokes
inquiry into his fraud, whereas one who is more meticulous does not
do so. The possibility that a forgery may lurk in the chain of title is
at least as good in one case as the other. On this reasoning, the pro-
posed statute does not single out the case of the "name variance" as a
special instance of title defect arising from possibility of forgery, but
makes the same rule apply "whether the persons appear in such con-
veyances under identical names or under variants thereof. .. ."
As suggested above, the problem of forgery of the title record can
be met either by foisting the risk upon the subsequent purchaser or by
permitting the forgery to operate, divesting the title of the true owner
in favor of a subsequent good faith purchaser. The general comments
which introduced this paper, relating to the need for more realistic
approaches to judging the marketability of titles, suggest the rationale
46 An objection to title based on a name variance in instruments recorded. less
than twenty years, and thus not "cured" by Wis. STAT. §235.69 (1963), is




for the position adopted in the proposed legislation. To this extent,
and for these reasons, subsections (1)(d)-(j) constitute deliberate,
though limited, reversals of the traditional rule of property law that a
forgery is an absolute nullity, and no right, title or interest can arise
out of it.
It should, perhaps, be noted that subsection (1) (d) does not pur-
port to "cure" a complete hiatus of title, but only a hiatus in fact
which does not appear affirmatively of record. Thus, if the owner of
record appeared as Charles D. Jones, a subsequent conveyance by Mrs.
Charles D. Jones, or Charlotte Jones, or Charles D. Johnson, would
not evoke this subsection. Such a defect could be cured, under the pro-
posed statute, either (1) by quieting title (and if such proceeding in-
volved a defect, subsection (g) might apply); or, (2) by filing an
affidavit identifying the missing conveyance in the chain and asserting
that it had in fact been executed and delivered, which would be effective
after five years under subsection (i); or, (3) by invoking the stale
notice provisions of subsection (k). Absent such curative procedures,
however, the appearance of "an affirmative and express notice of such
prior outstanding interest"-the interest of Charles D. Jones-under
subsection (2) (b) would indefinitely suspend possible operation of
the proposed statute against that interest.
(e) Marital Interests. Under existing law, a conveyance by a
married man of his homestead, without joinder or.estoppel of his wife,
is void.47 Such conveyance of non-homestead property is ineffective to
bar dower. Title problems arise chiefly in the case of failure of the
record to disclose the marital status of a male grantor. The possible
inferences are that he is either married or single. If married, either he
is attempting a fraud upon the interest of his wife, or she has included
her interest by a form of transfer not appearing of record. Even if the
former be true, the attempted fraud as to dower cannot be consum-
mated prior to widowhood.
It should be noted that such fraud upon the rights of a married
woman by failing to disclose marital status, is, like the misspelled
forgery, a clumsy attempt. A husband intelligently bent upon such
purpose would improve his prospects of success considerably by de-
claring himself to be single, divorced or widowed; and, if he had
been so inept in the first instance as to omit such declaration, he or
those holding under him would presumably have no reluctance to
supply the false evidence by affidavit under section 235.46 or other-
wise. The preferred device for perpetrating such a fraud, all things
considered, would probably be the substitution of a female imposter
for his lawful wife on the original deed or mortgage, thus placing the
case squarely within the forgery provisions of subsection (d).
47W's. STAT. §235.01(2) (1963).
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There are two considerations which differentiate this problem from
forgery problems in general, assuming our policy is to protect con-
tingent marital interests no more strongly than it protects a fee simple
absolute. The first additional consideration is that, in many cases, the
assertion of a marital interest against a subsequent bona fide purchaser
for value may permit the married woman both to "have her cake and
eat it." There is no necessary implication from the fact that a married
man conveys his land without his wife's joinder, that she is excluded
from at least unknowing participation in the fruits of his fraud. In-
deed, some of that fruit may persist, in disguised form, in the estate
of the husband at his death, and the wife may well be in position to
double her widow's entitlement by that fact. Assume a married man
who, by one or another of the suggested frauds, sells a piece of prop-
erty for $9000, which sum he collects from the purchaser and subse-
quently invests and reinvests, ultimately placing the resultant securities
in joint tenancy with the "defrauded" wife. He then dies. The widow
takes the entire lot of securities by survivorship, and also asserts, per-
haps against a bona fide purchaser, her entitlement to dower out of the
wrongfully conveyed property. The claim for breach of warranty by
the grantee from the husband goes begging for lack of probate assets.
The second distinguishing factor is that, in the ordinary case, a
wife is factually in position to exercise far closer surveillance over
the nefarious activities of her husband than is the victim of a fraud
perpetrated by a complete stranger. The married woman of today is
not the disentitled and disenfranchised demi-chattel in whose interest
dower and homestead protections were created centuries ago. Granting
that title law should lend no impetus to the disturbance of what little
domestic tranquillity may remain in the modern age, it is still possible
to assume that a married woman might perform discreet inquiries into
her husband's financial affairs at intervals not to exceed five years.
Under present law, it may be safely asserted that if she postpones such
inquiry for ten years, she will be barred in any event. 48
(f) Lack of authority of officers, agents, or fiduciaries. Obviously,
"any defect or insufficiency in authorization of any purported officer,
partner, agent or fiduciary to act in the name or on behalf of any ...
holder of an interest purported to be conveyed in a representative
capacity" means that the resultant conveyance, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, is a forgery. Little need be added to the foregoing reason-
ing on that generic subject, except that a forgery by the mechanism of
misrepresented power to act for another can be treated no differently
than forgery by the mechanism of impersonation. True, some types of
"power" are necessarily in writing, and therefore susceptible of being
recorded and scrutinized. This fact, however, tends more to emphasize
48 WIS. STAT. §330.04 (1963).
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than to diminish the need for including these "forgeries" within the
operation of the proposed statute, because the larger the possibility of
documentary "proof" of a title fact, the greater the opportunity for
technical objection to the form or sufficiency of such documents, and
the greater the likelihood that the documentary record will include
some error or emission.
One consideration which would appear to have peculiar importance
in this area is the fact that, unlike the case of the impersonator, the
agent-forger does not usually operate entirely outside of the protective
mantle of his purported principal. By an ill-defined and little-understood
principle of agency law, a principal is not chargeable with the guilty
knowledge of an agent or employee when that knowledge is acquired
directly out of a scheme to defraud the principal or employer.49 A
second principle which bears on the problem is the anomalous and
much-questioned "sealed instrument" or "equal dignity" rule, which
severely restricts implications of authorization in "sealed instrument"
cases.50 Carried to their logical extreme, these rules can, and at times
do, impose on modern title practice extremes of "authentication" which
once characterized the system of notarial acknowledgment. There certi-
fications were required by the clerk of courts that a notary was a
notary, by a judge that the clerk was a clerk, by the county clerk that
the judge was a judge, and so on ad absurdum.5s
A second special consideration which may apply here is the wide-
spread practice, at least of a large proportion of the principals whose
interests may be affected under this subsection, of requiring fidelity
bonds of their officers, partners, agents and fiduciaries. Since, as a
matter of legitimate practical inference, unauthorized conveyances of
the property of such principals will most commonly be attempted by
49 Farmer's Life Ass'n v. Houghton, 207 Wis. 357, 241 N.W. 357 (1932).
50 A concise statement of the "equal dignity rule" is found at 2 C.J.S. Agency
§27(d) (1936): "As a general rule, in order that an instrument under seal
may be validly executed by an agent, the agent's authority must have been
conferred on him by an instrument of equal dignity, and if the authority is
not so given, then the instrument executed by the agent is not binding ....
The rule has been changed in some of the states by statutes abolishing all
distinctions between sealed and unsealed instruments, in which case a sealed
authorization is unnecessary."
Wis. STAT. §235.01(1) (1963), provides that "conveyances of land or any
estate or interest therein may be made by deed signed and sealed by the per-
son from whom the estate or interest is intended to pass, being of lawful
age, or by his lawful agent or attorney." (Emphasis added.) The significance
of the seal in Wisconsin is properly the subject of speculation, in light of
the permissive rather than mandatory language of section 235.01(1), and the
statement in WIs. STAT. §235.19(13) (1963) that a properly acknowledged
conveyance is recordable although it is not sealed. This doubt as to the seal's
significance in conveyancing, by the "equal dignity" rule, creates similar un-
certainty as to its importance on an instrument permitting an "agent there-
unto authorized by writing" to execute a conveyance, given pursuant to Wis.
STAT. §240.06 (1963).
1The process of acknowledgment in Wisconsin has been greatly simplified by
the adoption of the Uniform Acknowledgment Act, Wis. STAT. §235.19 (1963).
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persons who hold some degree of authority from the same principals,
it would appear probable that many losses occasioned by defalcations
of this type will be compensable by claim on the bond. Whatever may
be the pros and cons of shifting such losses from principals to subse-
quent bona fide purchasers, different considerations may come into play
when the practical question is between a paid fidelity insurer and such
subsequent purchaser.
(g) Defects in judicial proceedings. It would not appear, under
present law, that a non-jurisdictional defect or irregularity in any action
or proceeding necessary to complete the chain of title constitutes an
objection to marketability, if the time for appeal has run.52 The title
problem arises principally in two slightly different aspects. Most com-
monly, the case record fails affirmatively to disclose that a jurisdictional
procedure has been followed. Furthermore, if the examiner be mildly
technical, he may well refuse to accept a bare recitation of that fact
in the prefatory recitals of the judgment or order itself.53 Less com-
monly, the examiner is in doubt whether the defect or irregularity in
question is jurisdictional or not.
In any event, the title record, necessarily examined and re-examined
upon the event of each title transaction for at least thirty years, is
complicated and extended by the full burden of papers and recitals
which happen to appear on file.
As was the case in subsections of the proposed legislation already
discussed, the omission of affirmative proof of jurisdiction in the record
can produce either of two implications: jurisdiction was acquired or it
was not. To assert that it was not requires a supposition that the
attorney, the clerk, and the presiding judge were either defrauders,
incompetents, or seriously careless, not an impossible supposition, but
an extremely tenuous one.
A strange legal anomaly appears here, which has some reflection in
the problem of forged instruments generally. By force of the familiar
presumption, the regularity of judicial proceedings is demonstrated,
prima facie, by the very fact that a judgment or order is entered.54
522 PATrON, TimLEs §591 (1957).
53 "In some localities, the attorneys give full faith and credit to the recitations
in judgment showing that the court had jurisdiction and that certain required
procedures were followed .... Attorneys in other areas insist on a fuller
abstracting, particularly of those documents establishing the jurisdiction of
the court .... ." Wis. PRAc. METH. §156 (1959). Pollard v. Wegener, 13 Wis.
636 (1861) (Recitals relating to due service held insufficient to establish juris-
diction, since if the record discloses that there was not such service in fact,
the court was without jurisdiction in all matters, including jurisdiction to make
the recital) : ".. . [I]f the facts upon Which the supposed jurisdiction was as-
sumed are recited in the record, and they appear from it to have been insuf-
ficient, and not such as in law would confer such jurisdiction, then the party
is not bound by it, but may disregard all its averments." Id. at 643.
54 Wis. Stat. §§262.16(6), 263.33 (1963). "It is not to be assumed that a court
of general jurisdiction in any case proceeded to adjudge upon matters over
which it had no authority; and its jurisdiction is to be presumed, whether
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Chapter 328 of the Wisconsin Statutes establishes numerous other
presumptions which variously affect title examination, and section
328.25, in particular, would appear to create a presumption that our
ubiquitous "Chas." Jones is really Charles. Nevertheless, title law and
practice appear to hold that the absence of a proof of service from a
court record, or the variance in spelling of Jones' name, creates a valid
objection to marketability of title.5- However, the filing of an affidavit
under section 235.46 creates "prima facie evidence" of the same fact
and thereby cures the defect.5 6 Obviously, these propositions are in-
consistent.
(h) Non-existence, incapacity or incompetency. A conveyance to a
nonexistent grantee, 57 or to one not legally entitled to hold realty, s is
void. A conveyance by a nonexistent grantor, or one not legally entitled
to convey by his own act, is at least voidable.5 9 These rules have
necessitated demonstration and redemonstration, examination and re-
examination, of supporting certifications with respect to conveyances
by or to corporations, partnerships, and even proprietorships, and have
in some cases even brought into question matters of personal emanci-
pation or competency.
Unless, however, circumstances prompt a far greater protection to
defectively organized or enfranchised corporations or to minor or in-
competent grantors than is given landowners generally, the possibility
of validation of deeds involving such defects must be countenanced to
the same extent that the possibility of validation of forgeries is coun-
tenanced. Added impetus is given to subsection (h), however, by the
fact that general corporate franchise laws now reduce the technicalities
of incorporation to a minimum and broadly extinguish the ultra vires
objection.60
(i) Facts not asserted of record. Existing section 235.46 creates
a prima facie presumption, for title purposes, of the truth of facts
relating to titles which are made to appear of record by affidavit. The
there are recitals in its record to show it or not." Linschitz v. C. A. Neuberger
Co., 230 Wis. 304, 310, 283 NW.. 811, 814 (1939).
55 Douglass v. Ransom, 205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).56 Haumersen v. Sladky, 220 Wis. 91, 264 N.W. 653 (1936).
57 City Bank of Portage v. Plank, 141 Wis. 653, 124 N.W. 1000 (1910); Marky
Investment, Inc. v. Arnezeder, 15 Wis. 2d 74, 112 N.W. 2d 211 (1961).58 Hanna v. Kelsey Realty Co., 145 Wis. 276, 129 N.W. 1080 (1911).
59 Lenhard v. Lenhard, 59 Wis. 60 (1883); Luedtke v. Luedtke, 181 Wis. 471,
195 N.W. 382 (1923).
60 Wis. Stat. §180.04 (1963): "General powers. Each corporation, when no in-
consistent provision is made by law or by its articles of incorporation, shall
have power:
(4) To purchase, take, receive, lease, take by gift, devise or bequest, or
otherwise acquire, and to own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and
with real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated.(5) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and other-
wise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets."
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inadequacies of this section, as an effective device for improvement of
title law and practice, have already been discussed.
Proposed subsection (i) is a logical and necessary concomitant of
subsections (a)-(h), and tends to be inclusive of all of them. It does
not appear of record, for example, that a deed was in fact undelivered
or conditionally delivered, but the deed itself recites that the lands
covered by it have been and are conveyed as of its date. Also, it may
not appear of record that a grantor under subsection (e) was a married
man at the time of his conveyance. However, if his conveyance asserts
that he is single, unmarried, divorced or widowed, "the opposite or
contradiction" of the fact that he was married would appear "affirma-
tively and expressly in a conveyance ... of record."
It is to be confidently supposed that subsections (a)-(h) will, of
their own force, perfect titles involving the particular defects specified
in them, generally after expiration of the grace period, and therefore
dispense with the necessity of extinguishing the identical defects by
filing affidavits under (i). Assuming that section 235.46 is retained in
its present form, it may still be possible to "cure" defects by "manu-
facturing marketability" during the five-year grace period by filing
affidavits, e.g., of identity, during that interim. However, this practice
will be unnecessary if the title thereafter qualifies under subsection (d).
It is, therefore, the function and purpose of subsection (i) to cover
cases identical in basic principle with those specified in (a)-(h), but
which do not fall within the specifications of any of those subsections.
It is anticipated that such cases will be relatively few in number, and
will principally concern instances of rather complete hiatus of title. An
illustration of such a possibility, with reference to subsection (i), was
given at the discussion of subsection (d), supra. A second illustration
might involve a conveyance which was made expressly subject to a
condition subsequent or other defeasance, or made subject to a condi-
tional covenant. By affidavit, the nonoccurrence or occurrence of the
condition could be made to appear of record; and, after five years,
subsection (i) would enable the bona fide purchaser to rely upon the
assertion.
(j) Defects in tax deed. By the provisions of subsection (j), non-
existence or illegality of proceedings, from the assessment of real estate
for taxation up to and including the execution of a tax deed, would not
defeat the interest of a subsequent bona fide purchaser whose interest
arose five years after recording of such tax deed.61 Thus, this section
would accomplish the salutary purpose of removing a common form
of title objection which, under present law and practice, often proves
insuperable without formal quiet title proceedings.
61WIS. STAT. §235A6 (1963), provides for an affidavit of possession as prima
facie evidence of the fact of possession.
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(k) Interests not of record within 30 years. This subsection, effec-
tively a restatement of the ultimate provisions of section 330.15, has
been adequately discussed.
VII. SCOPE AND EXCLUSIONS
The scope of the proposed legislation's applicability is found in
the generic statement of interests to be avoided, found in section (1),
and discussed above; in provisions specifying instances in which a
purchaser is held to have notice of a prior outstanding claim or interest,
found in section (2) ; and in provisions expressly excluding specified
interest holders and types of realty from the operation of the proposed
statute, which exclusions are found in section (3).
A. GENERIC STATEMENT OF INTERESTS TO BE AVOIDED
No attempt was made in section (1) of the proposal to specify the
particular prior outstanding interests which are affected by its pro-
visions.62 This is partly because the interests to which the proposal
pertains are largely self-identifying, and partly to avoid the dangers
implicit in the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius.6 3 Section 235.49
seems to have met with little difficulty in its generic statement of in-
terests to be avoided, 64 and none is expected with respect to the pro-
posed statute.
B. SPECIFICATION OF INSTANCES IN WHICH A PURCHASER
IS HELD TO HAVE NOTICE
Instances in which a purchaser is held to have notice of a prior
claim are specified in section (2). Subsection (2) (a) provides for
notice from use or occupancy. Notice from possession traditionally
negatives bona fide purchaser status. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
in Miller v. Green,65 noted that "the general rule is that possession of
land is notice to the world of whatever rights the possessor may have
in the premises."
The theory of the law is that the person in possession may be
asked to disclose the right or title which he has in the premises,
and the purchaser will be chargeable with the actual notice he
would have received had he made inquiry.66
62As was attempted in Wis. STAT. §330.15(4) (1963).
63 "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
64 "Conveyance of real estate" as used in WIs. STAT. §235.49 (1963) is defined
in Wis. STAT. §235.50 (1963) as "every instrument in writing by which any
estate or interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged or assigned or
by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity .... "
Under this generic definition, a variety of interests have been avoided other
than those expressly set out. See Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis. 659, 111 N.W.
701 (1907) (agreement preserving a tract of land for residential purposes
only and executed so as to be entitled to record, held to "affect" title to real
estate within the meaning of section 235.50); Cutler v. James, 64 Wis. 173,
24 N.W. 874 (1885) (a quit claim deed held to be a "conveyance" within




However, the court noted that:
The authorities generally hold that in order that possession may
constitute constructive notice such possession must be 'open,
visible, exclusive, and unambiguous.' It will thus be seen that
the requirement as to the type of possession that will constitute
constructive notice are practically identical with the requirements
of the type of possession necessary to constitute adverse posses-
sion.6 T (Citations omitted.)
The principle that one is chargeable with notice of such rights as
due and diligent inquiry of persons in possession would have disclosed
is disarmingly simple of statement, but sometimes extremely difficult
of application. The problem cases spring essentially from situations in
which "possession" by one person is alleged to constitute notice of the
interests of another. Some of these confusions are:
1) Whether A's possession, as claimant of fee title, is notice of
the unrecorded interest of B, as mortgagee, as lienholder, as easement-
holder, as covenantee, as optionee, as spouse of A, or as purchaser,
68
and
2) Whether B's possession, as tenant, licensee, purchaser, or holder
of other form of inferior interest derived from A's title, is notice of
the superior interest of A, again assuming the inferior interest to be
unrecorded,69 and
3) Whether C's possession, as tenant in common or joint tenant
of D is notice of D's cotenancy, assuming D's interest to be unrecorded.7 0
Another problem, springing from the same generic source, is the
problem of distinguishing "possession," from which notice may be
derived, from mere "occupancy," which affords no notice of the rights
of the occupant. Thus, if A is paramount titleholder in actual possession,
it is ordinarily held that no notice arises from the fact that W, A's wife,
or M, A's mortgagee, or P, purchaser under contract from A, or T, a
leaseholder, simultaneously occupy unsegregated portions of the prem-
ises. Where possession is "consistent with record title," no notice of in-
67 Id. at 163-64, 58 N.W. 2d at 707.
68 It would seem, under the familiar rule, that if possession is referable to a
known right of the possessor, no further inquiry is necessary. First Nat'l
Bank v. Savings L. & T. Co., 207 Wis. 272, 280, 240 N.W. 381, 384 (1932).
The interest of A would give no notice of B's unrecorded inferior interest.
BUT SEE Comment, Grantor's Possession as Constructive Notice, 34 Miss.
L. J. 325 (1963).
69 Possession by, e.g., a tenant, is notice of his rights. That such possession may
also give notice of the superior rights of the one through whom the inferior
interest holder possesses, see Ostergard v. Norker, 102 Neb. 675, 169 N.W. 5
(1918).
70 That possession by a tenant in common is not notice of the unrecorded interest
of his cotenant, see Tyler v. Johnson, 61 Fla. 730, 55 So. 870 (1911) ; Wilcox
v. Loominster Nat'l Bank, 43 Minn. 541, 45 N.W. 1136 (1890). Also, since a
cotenant is entitled to possession, there would be no further duty of inquiry.




consistent interests arises.71 It is from this principle that the element of
"exclusive and unambiguous" possession, as applied to both statutes of
limitations and conventional recording acts, springs.
The approach to these problems adopted for the purposes of the
proposed subsection (2) (a) is two pronged. First, notice from actual
use or occupancy of the real estate by any person at the time such
purchaser's interest therein arises" is specifically stated to extend to,
but not to exceed, the notice which "due and diligent inquiry of persons
using or occupying such real estate would, under the circumstances,
reasonably have disclosed. . . ." (Emphasis added.) This is a direct
incorporation of a doctrine often expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.7 2 By this doctrine, the proposed subsection (2)(a) would or
would not afford notice in each of the suggested areas of problem-cases
dependent upon the simple fact-inquiry: Would the occupant, under the
circumstances, reasonably have disclosed the outstanding interest to the
subsequent purchaser? If the occupant's own claim was adverse to,
or asserted in fraud of, the outstanding claim, clearly no inquiry of
the occupant would bring the outstanding claim to light.
The second aspect of the proposed subsection (2) (a)'s approach to
the problem is that each actual occupant or user of the subject premises
is made a potential source of notice for purposes of the statute, because
the traditional requirement of "exclusive and unambiguous" possession
is expressly lifted. It is lifted here for precisely the reason that it is
retained generally as a requirement for title by adverse possession, viz.,
the fact that a true owner should not be subject to usurpation of his
title unless the usurper has totally excluded him from use and occupancy,
both personal and representative.
It is conceded that this proposed section will relieve the subsequent
purchaser from his present scrupulousness in checking record title only
by imposing upon him a greater burden of diligence in investigating
physical use and occupancy, and that the latter burden may be heavier
under the proposed statute than is generally true under conventional
recording acts. However, it is also true that the subsequent purchaser
presently finds no relief whatever in conventional recording acts from
the kind of title defects with which the proposals will deal. Conversely,
"nonrecording" under conventional recording acts can extinquish legiti-
mate interests only where the record itself affords no hint of those
interests, and this utter lack of record notice is almost universally due
to the failure of the prior interest-holder to protect himself by prompt
recording. Under the proposed legislation, as has been seen, the oppor-
tunity for self-protection by record offered the prior claimant is not so
71 First Nat'l Bank v. Savings L. & T. Co., supra at note 70.
72First Nat'l Bank v. Chafee, 98 Wis. 42, 73 N.W. 318 (1897) ; Olmsted v. M11c-
Crory, 158 Wis. 323, 148 N.W. 871 (1914).
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universal. Consequently, a requirement that he be rather totally excluded
from any share of the use and occupancy appears to be justified.
The degree of practical "hardship" which this requirement may
impose on the subsequent purchaser may seem extreme, until his situa-
tion under the proposed subsection (2) (a) is compared with the situa-
tion in which he presently finds himself. At present, he is vulnerable to
substantially every possibility of title defect, regardless of whether he
is warned that such defect exists by record or by possessory fact. He
must scrupulously pursue every suspicious circumstance discovered at
either source; and ultimately, if such suspicions persist, his only safe
alternative is to refuse to accept title. Under the proposed legislation,
he may proceed in spite of the fact that record title is suspicious, if the
possessory fact lends no weight to those suspicions. He is protected
against record defects to the extent that the possessory fact does not
tend to corroborate them.
Subsection (2) (b) provides that a purchaser has notice of a prior
outstanding claim if the thirty year record affords "affirmative and
express notice" of such claim. Such notice must, by the provisions of
subsection (2) (b), conform to the requirements of definiteness set
out in subsection (1) (b). Therefore, such notice must refer to the
"conveyance, transaction, or event upon which" the interest depends.
As is true of the present section 330.15, the measurement of the period
runs backward from "the time at which the interest of such [subse-
quent bona fide] purchaser arises in law or equity."
The principal problem foreseen with reference to this provision is
that created by the "pro-tanto" concept, which, whatever its problems
may be with reference to "purchaser for value," has a clear impact
upon the broader doctrine of bona fide purchase. For example, A,
ostensible titleholder of record, has entered into an installment land
contract with B, upon which B has made a ten percent deposit. X is
holder of a prior outstanding interest dependent for its validity or
priority upon one of the circumstances specified in (1) (a)-(j). When
A's legal or equitable interest arose, either a grace period or notice
apart from the record prevented his qualification under the proposed
statute; B could qualify as of the time of his land contract, but for the
fact that he had paid only a portion of his agreed consideration. The
question, assuming that X now records notice of his interest, is whether,
following the negotiable instruments principle of "holder in due course
pro tanto," B's right to benefit by the statute should be limited to ten
percent of the land (or its value), or whether his protection shall
continue through the completion bf his contract and ultimate deed.
A second offshoot of essentially the same problem is presented by
the lease with option to purchase, exercisable at any time prior to
termination of the leasehold. If notice of the "prior outstanding interest"
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interrupts the lease period, even assuming that the leaseholder may
"hold free" for the balance of his term, is he a "bona fide purchaser for
value" with respect to his option rights?
By the specification of (2) (b) that notice of the outstanding interest
must come "prior to the time at which the interest of such subsequent
bona fide purchaser arises in law or equity,"7 3 the proposals would seek
to protect the subsequent interest to the full extent of its equitable
potential. In short, the "pro tanto" concept is rejected, not so much be-
cause of any firm conviction that it is a weak or improper jurisprudential
principle, but chiefly because of the impropriety and practical difficulty
of partitioning lands so as to accommodate it. The same problem, and
the same solution, are familiar law under conventional recording acts,
for example section 235.49.
The next step, too, is involved. Having permitted B in the example
above to "hold free of" the X claim, despite his ten percent payment,
what will happen if B thereafter defaults his contract? Assuming that
the resultant foreclosure is "strict," so that the unencumbered title
reverts to A, it could be safely assumed that A does not thereby improve
his original position, so as to hold free of X's claim. But suppose that
A's foreclosure is "affirmative," e.g., by sale in enforcement of his
equitable lien, pursuant to judgment of specific performance. Inescap-
ably, the purchaser at such sale would succeed to the rights of B, and
this could be true even if A were himself such purchaser.
In negotiable instruments law, the rights of successors to holders
in due course are rather carefully spelled out; but whether or not "re-
acquirers" share without discrimination in those rights has been, to a
large extent, a matter of judicial decision. It has been thought preferable,
in proposing this title legislation, to leave such highly-circumstantial
problems to the area of judicial decision, confident that familiar equit-
able considerations will produce proper results.
The final doubt which may arise concerning (2) (b) is the meaning
of the term "affirmative and express notice." Perhaps the term "defi-
nite," as used in (1) (b), and there defined, would be preferable. In
any event, the meanings appear to be complete equivalents, and no
difficulty should be encountered.
Finally, subsection (2) (c) makes the quite obvious provision that
if a grace period is provided under subsections (1) (c)-(k), and the
purchaser takes before the grace period has run, the purchaser is held
to have notice of the prior outstanding claim or interest for purposes
of the proposed statute.
C. NON-APPLICABILITY OF PROPOSED STATUTE TO
SPECIFIED REALTY AND INTERESTS




cability is delineated is the provisions of section (3), which exclude
certain interests from the operation of the statute altogether.
Interests of governmental units and public utilities are, by sub-
section (3)(a), generically excluded from the operation of the pro-
posed statute. The justification of the exclusion, which also appears in
section 330.15, is the manifest impracticality of protecting the typical
land-interests of such entities against a "nonrecording" statute. To
record claims in the nature of highway easements, to cite but a single
example, would involve a complication of metes and bounds descrip-
tion of such size as to choke the facilities of the average register of
deeds office.
"Wild" lands have, by judicial decision, been exempted from the
operation of statutes of limitations, fundamentally on the ground that
ordinary possessory safeguards against invasion are neither customary
nor practical with respect to them.14 Since the proposed legislation
places heavy reliance upon normal possessory safeguards to protect
legitimate interests against substantial risk of unfair usurpation, it is
thought inappropriate to apply the shortened "grace periods" to "wild
lands," at least in blanket fashion; and they are, therefore, excluded
from operation of the proposed statute by subsection (3) (b).
Subsection (3)(b) contains several "exceptions to the exception,"
thus providing that despite the fact that lands may be described as
"vild," prior outstanding interests in them dependent for their validity
upon certain evidences of title may nonetheless be barred by operation
of the proposed statute. These evidences are covered in the "non-
recording" provisions of (1) (a), the indefinite reference provisions of
(1)(b), the tax title provisions of (1) (j), and the "stale notice" pro-
visions of (1) (k). Because of their close alliance to conventional
principles of nonrecording, it is felt that the fact that lands involved
in these instances might be termed "wild" is of little relevance.
To describe real estate as "wild" is obviously unacceptable as a
technique of draftsmanship, as is the convenient alternative of describing
it simply as "vacant." Neither term has sufficient definiteness or scope.
However, when only that real estate which is, at once, "wholly un-
platted, vacant and unoccupied, unused, unimproved, and uncultivated"
is exempted, there is achieved a fairly exact specification of the type
of lands which, in average experience, may well go without inspection
for protracted periods of time.
The proposed subsection (3) (b) specifies as the critical time at
which the "wildness" will exempt the lands from operation of the
statute, "the time at which such subsequent bona fide purchaser's in-
terest arises." Such specification may involve a mechanical problem,
,4 Bassett v. Soelle, 186 Wis. 53, 202 N.W. 164 (1925) ; Bino v. Hurley, 14 Wis.
2d 101, 109 N.W. 2d 544 (1961).
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in that it affords no significance whatever to the "wildness" of the
lands at any time prior to the stipulated time. Hence, if a usurper
falsifies the record of "wild" lands, the true owner is protected against
the possible "subsequent bona fide purchaser" after the grace period
only so long as the lands remain in precisely that condition.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many state have been wrestling with the marketable title problem.
Out of these struggles, a number of statutes have emerged.7 5 While all
of these enactments are generically "marketable title" legislation, they
usually approach the problem in one of two ways. First, they may take
the "form" of statutes of limitations. 6 Secondly, the statutes of some
states approach the problem by cutting off adverse interests beyond a
given period, unless notice of the interest has been filed.
7 7
The proposed Wisconsin statute would be basically of the latter
category, relieving parties to a title transaction of the need for clarifying
and correcting the record as to non-current defects. The proposed
statute would reverse the title examiner's inclination to place the worst
possible construction on title defects, and, generally after five years,
establish a conclusive presumption that evidence not appearing expressly
and affirmatively of record would, if it were available, prove favorable
to marketability. It is in this way that the proposed legislation offers
to satisfy the modern need for a more facile and realistic approach to
the determination of the marketability of titles.
75 FLORIDA: FL". STAT. §§712.01-.10 (Supp. 1965), Boyer and Shapo, Florida's
Marketable Title Act: Prospects and Problems, 18 U. MIAmI L. REV. 103
(1963) ; ILLINOIS: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §§12.1-.4 (Supp. 1965), Rohde, lli-
nois Marketable Title Act, 39 CHL-K NT L. REV. 49 (1962); INDIANA: IND.
STAT. ANN. §§56-1101-1110 (Bums Supp. 1966), Note, The Indiana Marketable
Title Act of 1963: A Survey, 40 IND. L. J .21 (1964) ; IOWA: IowA CODE ANN.
§§614.17 (1958), Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47
IOWA L. REv. 261 (1962); MASSACHUSETTS: MAss. GEN. LAws ANNO. 184
§§26-30 (Supp. 1965), Note, The Massachusetts Marketable Title Act, 44 B.
U. L. REV. 201 (1964) ; MICHIGAN: MIcE. STAT. ANN. §§26.1271-.1279 (1953),
Forty Year Marketable Title Act, 35 MIcH. S. B. J. 12 (August, 1956) ; MIN-
NESOTA: MINN. STAT. ANN. §541.023 (Supp. 1965); NEBRASKA: NEB.
REv. CODE §§76-288-298 (1958); NORTH DAKOTA: N. D. CENT. CODE §§47-
19A-01- 11 (1960), Leahy, The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act,
29 N. D. L. REV. 265 (1953); OHIO: OHIO REv. CODE §§5301.47-.56 (1964),
Smith, The New Marketable Title Act, 22 OHIO ST. L. J. 712 (1961); OKLA-
HOMA: OKLA. STATS. ANN. 16 §§71-81 (Supp. 1965), Simes, The Improve-
ment of Conveyancing: Recent Developments, 34 OKLA. B. J. 2357 (1963);
SOUTH DAKOTA: S. D. CODE §§51.16B01-.16B14 (1960); UTAH: UTAH
CODE ANN. §§57-9-1-9-10 (1963), Swenson, The Utah Marketable Title Act,
8 UTAH L. REV. 200 (1963).
76 Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Ohio, Wisconsin. Cf. text
accompanying note 18 supra.7 7 Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah.
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